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 Two Strands of Research on Increasing 
Inequality 
 
Research by economists into the causes of the increase in inequality in the U.S. has focused on two 
explanations — an increase in firms’ ability to extract monopoly rent, and an increase in the variance 
of earnings among firms. 
 
 
Increase in Economic Rents 
Economists have documented an increase over the last 30-plus years in the ability of firms to extract 
economic rents. Three developments in particular have been important: an increase in market 
concentration, an expansion of the scale and scope of patent and copyright protections, and the 
adoption of the financial model of the firm by non-financial corporations.  
 
A shift in the framework guiding anti-trust policy following new merger guidelines in 1982 changed 
the focus of enforcement of anti-trust policy from the effect of mergers on competition to an almost 
exclusive focus on efficiency (Stoller 2016; Mitchell 2016:11). The welfare effects of mergers depend 
crucially on whether they lead to higher prices or to increases in efficiency, but these effects have 
been difficult to disentangle. Recently developed empirical techniques enabled researchers at the 
Federal Reserve to separate out these effects (Blonigen and Pierce 2016). Using plant-level data for 
US manufacturing over 1997-2007, they find large and significant increases in the mark-up of prices 
over production costs for acquired plants relative to those not acquired. But they find no statistically 
significant effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the productivity of plants or the efficiency 
of firms. Similar results for a broader set of industries were found by Barkai (2016). Another study 
found concentration increased in over 90 percent of U.S. industries since 2000 as the number of 
publicly-traded companies declined (Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely 2015). The researchers found an 
increase in the return on assets, mainly driven by the ability of firms to raise profit margins, not due 
to improvements in operational efficiency, but to an increase in market power. 
 
Patents and copyrights give their holders a temporary monopoly that enables them to charge higher 
prices. This serves as a mechanism for financing innovation, research, and creative endeavors. But 
they also provide incentives for rent-seeking behaviors. Extending the period of the monopoly and 
expanding the scope of patent and copyright protections lets companies collect monopoly rents far 
in excess of incentives for innovation and creativity. Changes in laws and court rulings since 1980 
allow life forms, business methods, and software to be patented. Copyright protection now applies 
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 to a wide range of digital reproductions. In addition, the length of copyright protections has 
increased from 55 to 95 years (Ravi Katari and Dean Baker 2015).  
 
Less familiar is the shift over the last 30-plus years from a managerial model of the firm to a 
financial model that has altered the nature of value creation by nonfinancial corporations. In the 
managerial model, value is mainly created, extracted, and distributed through the labor process. 
Companies view their purpose as producing goods and services with the goal of making a profit. 
Business strategy and investment decisions are in the hands of company executives whose goal is to 
increase production, revenue, and market share. This requires a productive workforce willing to 
cooperate in meeting company goals, typically elicited by a willingness on the part of management to 
share productivity gains with workers. Top management reinvests the share of profits retained by 
the company in worker skills, technology, and research and development. These profit-seeking 
activities increase the size of the economic pie, allowing both the slice of the pie going to profit and 
the slice going to labor to increase. 
 
Companies that adopt the financial model of the firm take a different approach to value creation, 
extraction, allocation, and distribution. Deregulation of financial markets and legal changes since 
1980 paved the way for the spread of the financial model of the firm (Appelbaum and Batt 2014: 
Chapter 2). Acceptance of principal-agent theory (Jensen and Metzger 1976), in which managers – 
the agents – are charged with single-mindedly serving the interests of the principals – the firm’s 
shareholders – by maximizing shareholder returns has altered the logic of value creation. Financial 
actors now dictate business strategy and decisions in many nonfinancial corporations, with an eye on 
maximizing their own returns. (Froud and Williams 2007; Krippner 2011; Appelbaum and Batt 
2014; Gospel, Howard, Pendleton and Vitols 2014).  
 
Rent-seeking behavior is widespread in financialized firms which increasingly undertake financial 
activities designed to enrich shareholders that have little to do with producing goods and services. 
The labor process, while important, is less central to the firm’s financial success. The need to invest 
in and retain employees with firm-specific skills or to pay wages that ensure labor’s cooperation has 
become less relevant. Cost containment via work intensification, subcontracting, and a range of low-
wage alternative work arrangements has become more widespread. Labor contracts – explicit and 
implicit – have lost their moral content and, like any other contract, can be broken (Appelbaum, Batt 
and Clark 2013). Management generates revenue that can be distributed to shareholders by selling 
off company assets, making greater use of debt, increasing the use of junk bonds, making strategic 
use of bankruptcy, increasing dividend payouts, engaging in share buybacks to manipulate share 
price, and aggressively using tax arbitrage/tax avoidance to raise after-tax profits. Top management’s 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders by tying executive pay to share price. The result has 
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 been a dramatic rise in CEO pay (Davis and Mishel 2014). Share buybacks and dividend payouts are 
advantageous to shareholders and to corporate executives, but they do nothing to increase the size 
of the economic pie. They have come to replace productivity-enhancing investments in equipment 
and workers as the main use of retained earnings (Lazonick 2014).  
 
Activist hedge funds that buy up blocks of shares in publicly-traded companies and pressure 
management to sell off real estate assets and distribute the proceeds to shareholders are collecting 
rents (Appelbaum 2014). The same is true of private equity firms that take over companies, split 
them into a property company that owns the real estate and an operating company that operates the 
business, and then sell the real estate in a sale-lease back deal — pocketing the proceeds and putting 
the operating company at risk of bankruptcy (Appelbaum 2012). An entire industry has grown up 
around the aggressive pursuit of tax arbitrage and tax loopholes that allow corporations and the 
wealthy to avoid paying their fair share taxes and to capture a larger slice of the economic pie at the 
expense of the tax paying public. 
 
Thus, powerful companies use their dominant position in markets (Krugman 2013) or patent and 
copyright protections (Ravi and Baker 2015) to earn monopoly rents at the expense of consumers; 
or they use their wealth to gain favorable regulations and tax breaks at the expense of taxpayers 
(Bessen 2016). The increase in the income share of the top one percent of households went from 
about 10 percent in 1980 to about 20 percent in the years 2010 to 2015 and is largely attributable to 
an increase in economic rents captured by these households (Mishel and Bivens 2013; Baker 2016).  
 
The link between increases in economic rents on the one hand and rising inequality of income and 
wealth on the other is due to the zero-sum nature of rent-seeking behavior. Since rent-seeking 
activities do not increase the size of the economic pie, it follows in an accounting sense that if some 
economic actors gain, others must lose (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2012). 
 
 
Increase in Earnings Inequality 
A second stream of research examines the increase in wage inequality. Careful empirical work 
confirms informed conjectures made earlier by economists that an increased variance in earnings 
among firms is a major contributor to the increase in wage inequality among workers with similar 
skills and characteristics (Furman and Orszag 2015; Handwerker 2015).  
 
Analysis of rising wage inequality by Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom and von Wachter (2015) over 
1971 to 2013 finds that the increase in earnings inequality is mainly due to the rising variance of 
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 earnings between firms. They find that about 75 percent of the rise in earnings inequality is due to 
the increased variance in between-firm earnings rather than to an increase in earnings inequality 
within firms. There are two exceptions: the wages of the top 1 percent of earners within firms rose 
relative to other employees; and there was more increase in within-firm earnings inequality in the 
largest firms. The increasing variance of earnings between firms was due not to differences in the 
types of workers employed by firms, but to differences in mean pay levels.  
 
A study by Richard Freeman and colleagues finds an increase in inequality in earnings among firms 
between 1977 and 2009 that, in turn, is mirrored in the increase in inequality in earnings among 
workers with similar skills and characteristics (Freeman 2016; Barth, Byson, Davis and Freeman 
2016). The researchers find that most of the observed increase in inequality among workers occurs 
not between higher- and lower- skilled workers within establishments, but rather is due to an increase 
in inequality among workers with similar skills employed in different establishments. This, they find in 
their main analysis, accounts for over two-thirds of the increase in earnings inequality between 
workers. A separate analysis using different data finds that nearly four-fifths of the increase in wage 
inequality is associated with an increase in between-establishment inequality.  
 
One commonly observed phenomenon is the outsourcing of lower value-added or more easily 
standardized and monitored activities to subcontractor firms. Increasingly, this has led to workers 
being sorted into establishments that disproportionately employ higher-skilled workers and those 
that disproportionately employ lower-skilled workers. This change in the composition of worker 
skills within organizations leads to an increase in wage inequality between establishments. It does not, 
however, lead to a change in overall wage inequality among workers, and thus cannot explain the 
increase in wage inequality in recent decades.  
 
It is important to be clear that it is the increase in inequality over recent decades that is analyzed in 
these studies of rising wage inequality and that is the focus of this article, not the determinants of the 
level of wage inequality. The level of wage inequality within organizations is much larger than between 
organizations.  
 
Freeman (2016: 16) notes that the increase in inequality in earnings among establishments cannot be 
explained by traditional differences in earnings due to factors such as industry, firm size, labor 
productivity, or capital per worker. It is instead, he argues, due to “characteristics of employers that 
standard data sets do not measure.”  
 
This article seeks to draw these two strands of research together and provide an explanation for the 
widely observed increase in inequality. It seeks to answer two questions: 
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• What is the role of rent in the increased variance in earnings among firms? 
• What is the mechanism that links the increase in rent extraction to the rise in inequality in earnings among 
workers with similar skills and characteristics? 
 
 
Overview of the Argument 
 
An important mechanism linking the increasing rents described above and the rising inequality 
among firms and workers, I argue, is the increase in domestic outsourcing and the rise in networked 
forms of production over the past three-and-a-half decades as firms have reorganized production 
processes to focus on maximizing shareholder value. This has been a multi-dimensional process 
involving (1) a large and changing role for finance, (2) consolidation of the largest enterprises, and 
(3) decentralization of the production and provision of goods and services facilitated by new 
technologies. Consolidation enhances the ability of the lead firm in a production network, and in 
many cases key subcontractor firms, to raise prices and extract monopoly rents. Consolidation has 
driven market concentration in many industries, reducing competition. This has been accompanied 
by the decentralization and outsourcing of goods production, logistics, and service activities. 
Outsourcing is facilitated by innovations in digital technology and logistics. It results, at least in part, 
from demands that companies maximize shareholder value, which has provided a rationale for the 
focus on core competencies. Outsourcing has also been driven by deliberate efforts of firms to 
circumvent legal constraints, union representation, and internal equity norms that limit their ability 
to pay different wages to similarly qualified workers. The ‘fissuring’ of employment (Weil 2014) as 
“firms shed activities to subordinate companies through subcontracting, third party management, 
and other organizational forms” facilitates differences in pay for similar workers employed in 
different establishments (Council of Economic Advisers 2016: 3).  
 
The heightened use of production networks has multiplied the contractual relationships among 
producers and suppliers, conferring on them legal claims to the value produced by the network that 
extend beyond an organization’s own contributions to production and reflect interfirm power 
relations. Firms with the greatest financial clout, market power, or patent or copyright protections 
are able to claim the largest part of the value – rents and profits – created by the network. They may 
share some of these rents with workers, due perhaps to unions or internal norms (Furman and 
Orszag 2015). Meanwhile, as the weakest organizations in a production network struggle to remain 
viable; the wages and employment security of their workers take the largest hit. Negative outcomes 
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 for these workers are limited only by social and political movements such as the Fight for $15, by 
employment laws such as the minimum wage, or by the strength of unions (Grimshaw, Willmott and 
Rubery 2005).The emergence of new financial actors since the late 1970s – activist hedge funds, 
private equity firms, real estate investment trusts, and increased use of debt by public and private 
companies – creates another layer of legal claims on value generated in production networks.  
 
Differences in the ability of organizations in a network to extract rents lead, in the first instance, to a 
redistribution of capital claims on value among enterprises; it does not necessarily imply an increase in 
the share of corporate earnings in GDP (Ravi and Baker 2015). Higher earnings of corporations that 
are able to extract value may be offset by the lower margins in weaker firms. Other measures, 
however, do exhibit declines in the share of output going to workers. Labor’s share of sales revenue 
of U.S. companies has declined (Barkai 2016: 9 and 24-26); as has labor’s share of national income – 
a broader concept than corporate profits (Council of Economic Advisers 2016: 1). The structure of 
firms has undergone a major evolution in the past three decades, as vertically integrated companies 
have focused on core competencies and outsourced many tasks previously performed in-house or by 
subsidiaries. It is the increasing presence of production networks, and differences in the ability of 
lead and contractor firms in the network to extract value, that contributes prominently to the rising 
inequality in earnings among firms and establishments. 
 
This is the means by which rents are extracted at the point of production. Workers experience these 
effects more directly and more persistently than the effects of rents extracted from them as 
consumers or taxpayers. 
 
 
From Vertically Integrated Firms to Domestic Outsourcing 
and Production Networks1 
For much of the 20th century, a significant part of economic activity took place in vertically 
integrated corporations in which hierarchical forms of organization replaced the market as the 
primary form of coordinating production. Economists explain this development in terms of 
transactions costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985). Firms and markets, in this 
framework, are alternative mechanisms for allocating labor and other resources and for coordinating 
production. When transactions are straightforward, are not repeated, and do not require investments 
in specific assets in order to be carried out, arms-length transactions governed by prices established 
in markets are an efficient means of organizing production. However, where outcomes are 
1  This section draws heavily on Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman, and Appelbaum (2016) and on Batt and Appelbaum (forthcoming 
2017). 
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 uncertain, interactions are repeated, or transaction-specific investments are required, vertically 
integrated firms are more efficient than markets for coordinating production. Large, vertically 
integrated corporations emerged early in the 20th century to minimize firms’ transactions costs. In 
particular, it was economically efficient for firms to employ workers and carry out production 
activities in-house when the costs of bureaucratic monitoring and control of employees were less 
than the costs of specifying, monitoring, and enforcing contracts with contractors and supplier 
firms. Hierarchy is also a governance mechanism for managing the conflicting interests of employers 
and workers (Marglin 1978). In large, hierarchical firms, managers are able to exercise authority over 
workers and achieve their cooperation in production activities; workers gain the economic security 
of regular employment, wages, and advancement opportunities (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Jacoby 
1985).  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, technological innovations affecting production, transportation, and 
monitoring activities began to undermine the rationale for organizing production in vertically 
integrated firms. The rise of mass production technologies and a mass market for these goods in the 
early years of the 20th century favored the emergence of large, vertically integrated firms to spread 
high fixed costs over a large volume of output and raise productivity (Chandler 1977, 1990). 
Managerial expertise and hierarchical organization proved essential for internal coordination of 
production processes and for ongoing improvements in productivity (Helper and Sako 2010). The 
development of new flexible manufacturing technologies that enabled firms to produce a greater 
variety of goods in small batches (Piore and Sabel 1984) and new management approaches (Jaikumar 
1986; MacDuffie 1995; Appelbaum and Batt 1994) undermined this rationale for the vertically 
integrated firm.  
 
Increased competition as a result of product market deregulation and trade agreements put pressure 
on firms to reduce costs. Financial deregulation, the rising influence of institutional investors, and 
the emergence of new financial actors that focused on maximizing shareholder value increased the 
pressure to sell off assets and reduce headcount (Appelbaum and Batt 2014). Firms responded by 
focusing on their “core competencies” and outsourcing both peripheral tasks and specialized 
functions to subcontractors (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Lepak and Snell 1999; Kogut and Zander 
1992). The resulting complex web of inter-firm relationships was facilitated by developments in 
information and digital technologies that enabled firms to outsource entire functions and to more 
easily monitor contractors.  
 
Contracting out for goods and services via business-to-business transactions is not new. But the 
scale and scope of this activity has been transformed in recent decades as large, hierarchical firms 
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 began to lose their organizational advantage, and changes in the mix of firms’ “make or buy” 
decisions altered the structure of the economy in fundamental ways.  
 
Advances in information and communication technologies lowered the cost of information 
processing and coordination of production across organizational boundaries, reducing the 
advantages of keeping production in-house. An early example comes from the customer service and 
sales activities of large telecommunications and financial services firms. Technological advances 
allowed these firms to consolidate what had been largely small in-house operations and, by the mid-
1990s, to outsource some call volume to third-party vendors. Lead firms set terms and conditions of 
vendor contracts, and vendors faced volatile conditions in terms of demand volume and contract 
renewal. A major establishment-level survey of call centers in 17 countries found lower pay and 
worse working conditions at call centers managed by vendors compared to those retained in-house 
(Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt and Nohara 2009).  
 
Digital technologies have increased the ability to codify knowledge and standardize production 
processes. They have supported the decomposition of complex processes, enabled firms to identify 
and codify separable parts of the production process, and facilitated standardization of interfaces. 
Standardization of design features of the production modules reduces the possibilities for contractor 
opportunism (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000). Business functions and customer-facing 
transactions have also been broken into their components and optimized in this way, leading to the 
widespread use of business process outsourcing (Deblaere and Osborne 2010).  
 
These technologies have improved the ability of firms to monitor and enforce contracts with 
external vendors and suppliers, thus reducing the advantage of hierarchy in coordinating production 
relative to the market (Cappelli 2016). Transaction cost arguments now suggest that market 
relationships among a complex web of producers may enjoy a cost advantage over vertically 
integrated firms.  
 
Core competency theory argues that firms can improve their competitive advantage by focusing on 
what they do best and eliminating other lines of business (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Lepak and 
Snell 1999). The shift to the financial model of the firm also increases the likelihood that firms will 
make greater use of domestic outsourcing. Unlike the managerial model of the firm in which capital 
assets are viewed as relatively fixed resources and retained earnings are used to expand company 
assets, in the financial model the corporation’s assets are viewed by top management as Lego pieces, 
to be bought and sold with the goal of increasing shareholder returns. Investment and business 
strategy decisions are made by economic actors whose only claims on the firm are financial and 
whose purpose is unlocking value that can be returned to shareholders. The result is deterioration in 
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 wages and working conditions for workers employed by subcontractors in outsourced operations 
(Weil 2014: 15, 100). Uncertainty over the duration or renewal of the contract translates into greater 
job insecurity for workers and greater use of nonstandard work arrangements.  
 
Recent empirical studies provide evidence that workers in outsourced operations suffer substantial 
pay penalties compared to workers in similar jobs that were not outsourced. Goldschmidt and 
Schmieder (2015) document the dramatic rise since 1980 in outsourcing in logistics, cleaning, 
security, and food services functions in Germany and the substantial decline in wages relative to 
similar jobs that were not outsourced. (See also Dube and Kaplan 2010.) Batt and colleagues find 
systematic differences between union, non-union in-house, and outsourced call center operations, 
with the latter providing substantially lower pay, benefits, and discretion as well as greater use of 
part-time and contingent work arrangements (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt, Doellgast, 
and Kwon 2006; Batt and Nohara 2009). 
 
 
Labor Market Segmentation 
 
The old labor market segmentation between workers (Gordon, Reich and Edwards 1982) has 
intensified. The quality of jobs and wages are likely to be worse in outsourced operations with 
thinner profit margins (Weil 2014). Small employers may bargain contracts with lead firms that set 
unrealistic performance requirements, leading to further work intensification (Ji and Weil 2015). This 
has contributed to the increase in contingent and nonstandard work arrangements between 2005 and 
2015. The share of workers in these arrangements increased slightly from 10.0 percent in 1995 to 
10.7 percent in 2005, but rose sharply to 15.8 percent in the 2005 to 2015 decade (Katz and Kruger 
2016).  
 
This is overlaid since 1980 by the new labor market segmentation in which a substantial share of 
employment is organized into production networks of strong firms that can extract value and 
weaker firms unable to defend themselves or their workers. While there is an overlap in these two 
types of labor market segmentation, employment in firms in production networks frequently 
consists of standard jobs not picked up in contingent worker surveys. Figure 1 illustrates the 
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 FIGURE 1 
Relationship between Contracting Out and Employment Status 
 
 
Source: Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman, and Appelbaum 2016. 
 
The increasing importance of networked production complicates the labor process. In a production 
network, the labor process is fragmented and engages workers employed in different organizations 
that occupy different positions in the network. Their labor is combined and their work coordinated 
via contracting relationships among more and less powerful employers that directly affect pay and 
working conditions.  
 
The workers themselves are separated by where in the supply chain or production network their jobs 
fall as well as by geographic distance. They have no organic relationships with each other that 
promote solidarity – common lunchrooms, common managers, common access to opportunities, 
common problems and irritants – and generally do not recognize their common interests, much less 
join together to defend them. The wages of workers with similar skills and demographic 
characteristics will vary depending on whether they are employed in a more powerful firm in the 
network and can share in the economic value captured by their employer or work in a less powerful 
firm in the network and have no such opportunity. 
 
 
Value Extraction in Production Networks 
 
The inherent conflicts of interest between labor and capital within firms over the distribution of the 
value created in the labor process have not disappeared. However, they now exist alongside new 
opportunities for inter-firm cooperation as well as new forms of capital-capital conflict among 
producers over the distribution of value created by the network (Marchington, Grimshaw, Rubery, 
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 and Willmott 2005; Rubery 2007) as well as between producer and financial interests. As Rubery 
recognized, networked forms of production ‘complexify’ the capital-labor relationship.  
 
While collaboration among networked firms producing complementary inputs is essential for 
production, asymmetric power relations push in the opposite direction. Rent seeking is about 
conflict over distribution with results largely determined by differences in bargaining power (Folbre 
2016: 28). Production networks produce goods and services, generate profits, and contribute to the 
size of the economic pie. Firms in the network may also generate economic rents. Power relations 
determine the distribution among these firms of the profit and rents created by the network. The pay 
of workers in a production network depends not only on their own skills and characteristics, but on their employers’ 
access to these rents.  
 
Jobs are often outsourced to weaker subcontractors that lack bargaining power. More powerful lead 
firms may pit these suppliers against one another, forcing them to bid down prices, undermining 
their ability to pay living wages. Or they may dictate the terms of service agreements and require 
short-term contracts. The resulting uncertainty and volatility undermines subcontractors’ ability to 
offer stable jobs.  
 
Using detailed German administrative data on the universe of workers and firms, Goldschmidt and 
Schmieder (2015) investigate the effect on wages when jobs are moved from lead firms to 
contracting firms. They find that wages of employees whose jobs have been outsourced to 
contractor firms fall by about 10 to 15 percent relative to what these same workers were paid prior 
to outsourcing. They attribute this to the fact that while the same work is being performed and the 
contribution to output is the same, the outsourced workers earn less because they no longer have 
access to the economic rents that are specific to the lead firm. The researchers make an especially 
strong case that wage loss for workers in jobs outsourced to contractor firms is due to their 
employment by subcontractors by examining situations in which a large employer outsources a 
group of workers (e.g., cafeteria workers) to a subcontractor but the outsourced workers continue to 
perform the same job at the same work site as before, yet earn lower wages. These wage losses stem 
from being excluded from lead firm rents. 
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 Power Relations vs. Productivity Differences 
Some researchers argue that interfirm differences in worker pay among seemingly similar workers 
reflect differences in the productivity of workers and hence the firms that employ them.2 Workers, 
they argue, are sorted into firms with higher or lower labor productivity. Low productivity 
employers with workers with below average productivity will have less latitude to pay above market 
wages (Card, Rute Cardoso, and Kline 2016a, 2016b). The study examined the gender wage gap, and 
found that women earned lower wages in part because women “tend to be employed at less 
productive firms that pay low wages to everyone (2016a: 3).”  
 
Like most studies of labor productivity, this study actually estimates labor revenue productivity – i.e., 
the researchers use revenue as a proxy for output. This creates a problem for interpreting their 
results. When power relations among firms in a network play a role in determining how much 
revenue each firm receives, it is impossible to determine to what extent higher labor revenue 
productivity is due to greater productive efficiency of a firms’ workers or to the greater ability of 
their employer to lay claim to jointly produced value. It is, thus, not possible to conclude that the 
rise in inter-firm inequality is primarily about high productivity firms leaving the rest behind. In the 
case of firms in a production network, it is about the ability of the lead firm to set prices that enable 
it to capture a disproportionate share of the net revenue accruing to the network, to the 
disadvantage of weaker firms and their employees.  
 
Primary or lead firms may not be the only firms in a network powerful enough to extract rents. An 
interesting example of the power exercised by contractor firms comes from the pharmaceutical 
industry. Mylan acquired the company that produces the lifesaving EpiPen in 2007 and has since 
increased its price 500 percent to $600 (Thomas 2016). Mylan’s CEO described the supply chain that 
is involved in getting the EpiPen to patients. She pointed out that of the $600 price, only $274 
comes to Mylan (Johnson 2016). Two of the companies – Express Scripts and CVS Health – handle 
prescription benefits for 75 percent of the market and use their market power to capture a 
substantial share of the monopoly rents from drug producers (Mitchell 2016: 17). Pharmacy benefit 
managers derive their power vis a vis the drug manufacturers from their ability to choose the drug 
makers whose products will be stocked by hospital pharmacies and considered ‘in the formulary’ 
when purchased by insured patients (Livingston 2016). 
 
2 For example, Jeanna Smialek (2015) quotes Fatih Guvenah, one of the researchers who documented the increasing 
variance in earnings between firms, as attributing this to the rise of ‘super firms’ – businesses in which skilled workers 
with higher productivity are concentrated.  
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 Forms of Networked Production 
The archetypal image of firm-to-firm contracting is the linear supply chain. This type of production 
network is common in manufacturing industries where, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, 
deregulation, the focus on maximizing shareholder value, and corporate policies led to the rise of 
supply chains. Following the emphasis on core competencies, large vertically integrated 
manufacturers began selling off assets and outsourcing work. Now, they function as the lead firm in 
a supply chain while production activities are outsourced to multiple tiers of suppliers (Helper and 
Kreuger 2016).  
 
Despite evidence that collaborative relationships improve the competitiveness of the supply chain’s 
products, relationships of lead firms to third and fourth tier suppliers are generally based on cost 
considerations (Whitford 2006) and are designed to guarantee that the lead firm and major 
contractors capture most of the profits and rents and maximize shareholder value. Too often, this 
leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ instead of a more collaborative structure (Helper and Kreuger 2016). 
Competition for a place in the third or fourth tier of supply chains is so intense that these firms 
frequently experience bankruptcy or are shut down for violating labor laws or health and safety 
regulations. Both innovation that would benefit the economy and the pay of workers are depressed 
in these weaker firms. 
 
Figure 2a illustrates the food supply chain in the U.S., showing the classic line of contracting from 
production (agriculture and fisheries) to food processing, warehouse and distribution, and all the 
way through to firms that sell food to consumers (retailers, restaurants and food service contractors 
that provide institutional food services to schools, hospitals, cafeterias) (Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman 
and Appelbaum 2016). While the food supply chain is not new, its nature has changed. 
Consolidation of customer-facing segments of the supply chain – in retail, restaurants, and food 
service contractor firms – have placed new pressures on companies and workers in upstream 
segments of the chain to reduce costs. In the retail segment of the food supply chain, increasing 
concentration is notable as supermarket chains consolidate in order to compete with Walmart, now 
the largest grocery chain in the U.S.; its requirement that suppliers keep costs low have reverberated 
along the food supply chain, depressing wages and unionization rates, and worsening working 
conditions in upstream companies (Food Chain Workers Alliance and Solidarity Research 
Cooperative 2016).  
 
The food service contractor segment that serves institutional clients is a highly concentrated part of 
the food supply chain. The top four companies – Compass, Aramark, Sodexo, and Delaware North 
– represent nearly 76 percent of total industry revenue (Brennan 2014). This segment of the food 
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 chain has experienced rapid growth: the clients it serves are under pressure from financial markets to 
focus on their core competencies and outsource nonessential functions. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Various Contracting Patterns 
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 Interfirm contracting includes a wide array of business-to-business transactions that are not well 
captured by the supply chain paradigm. Figure 2b illustrates what Barenberg (2015) calls the “hub 
and spoke” model of contracting, where the lead firm contracts with a number of other firms for 
on-site services. The diagram highlights the case of a building owner that contracts for on-site and 
off-site services. We can draw on our previous example to provide another illustration by putting 
any of the food service contractors at the hub and describing the spokes. Capitalizing on their 
relationships with government, education, business and other institutions, these firms have 
expanded the services they offer to include uniform rental, laundry and linen services, environmental 
services, technical support, security, patient transportation, clinical equipment maintenance and 
repair services, and facilities management services.  
 
The major food contractor service firms also enjoy substantial monopsony power that allows them 
to dictate wages when hiring workers. Workers employed directly by these firms earn an average of 
just $22,568 a year; the large and growing number of contingent workers earn even less. Overall the 
wage bill in food contractor services fell as a percentage of revenue over 2009 to 2013, raising the 
average industry profit margin over this period (Brennan 2014). 
 
Figure 2c illustrates a non-hierarchical production network, featuring continuous collaboration 
between video game publishers, console manufacturers, and software developers and designers 
(Balland, De Vaan, and Boschma 2013). Here we expect the profits and any rents to be shared more 
or less equally among firms and outcomes for similar workers to be approximately the same. 
 
Figure 2d shows the classic pyramidal franchising structure that is prevalent in fast food, hotels and 
other industries (Weil 2014). Franchisors are expected to deliver value to shareholders – whether 
public market or private equity owners. Financial engineering by these more powerful firms allows 
them to capture much of the value produced by franchisees via the franchise fee, service fees, 
licensing fees and rent on the leased facilities (Peterson 2014).  
 
With so much of the value generated at franchisee establishments claimed by the ‘brands,’ 
franchisees are under pressure to keep wages low and to cut corners on health and safety 
(Ruckelshaus, Smith, Leberstein, and Cho 2014). Despite strong demand for workers and the Fight 
for $15 movement, fast food jobs are among the lowest paid occupations in the economy. 
 
Finally, Figure 3, which depicts outsourcing in the hotel industry, illustrates how several different 
interfirm contracting structures may form a complex network of firms that operate together to 
deliver a set of final services to the consumer (adapted from Barenberg 2015: Figure 7; see also Weil 
2014). The figure shows the franchising structure of a hotel brand, the services contracting of a 
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 particular hotel, the logistics contracting chain for delivering furniture and linens, and the use of 
independent contractors in trucking and of temp staffing firms in warehouses.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Combination of Contractual Patterns 
 
 
Source and notes: Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman, and Appelbaum 2016. Modified from Barenberg 2015. 
 
Research on the effects of franchising on HR practices and employee earnings in hotel chains is 
facilitated by the fact that some hotels are owned by the firm that controls the brand (the franchisor) 
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 while others are franchised to independent owners (franchisees). Hotels that are company-owned 
may benefit from the ability of the franchisor to capture rents accruing to the brand from hotels 
they own and from franchisee-owned hotels via the array of fees and charges collected from the 
franchisee. These earnings premia can then be used by the franchisor for employee benefits, 
training, and higher employee earnings in company-owned hotels. Franchisees may choose to ‘free 
ride’ on the brand’s reputation by reducing labor costs even at the expense of the quality of the 
customer experience (Tashlin Lakhani 2016). 
 
In the two ownership structures, Lakhani finds that workers in company-owned hotels fare better 
when comparing earnings of front of the house hotel employees. Difference in years of education 
between desk clerks in franchisee-owned and company-owned hotels is small – 13.28 vs. 13.49 years, 
as is the difference in median wages – $9.40 in franchisee-owned and $9.54 in company-owned 
hotels. However, company-owned hotels typically provide more benefits and higher annual earnings. 
Annual earnings are $17,262 in company-owned hotels compared with $15,558 in franchisees as 
franchisees employ a far smaller share of full-time workers.  
 
Differences in earnings extend to workers employed by subcontractors. The warehouse and logistics 
industry has been reshaped by the emergence of third party logistics firms (3PLs), with sharp 
differences in pay and working conditions depending on whether workers are on the payroll of the 
firms whose goods are being stored, transferred and shipped or are employees of the 3PLs. The 
3PLs contract with temp agencies for workers to staff warehouses as ‘pickers’ who find objects that 
have been ordered and who unpack, repack, load and ship goods to their destinations and with 
independent contractors for trucking services. They encourage truck drivers and temp firms to 
compete for contracts, placing continuous downward pressure on pay (Ruckelshaus, Smith, 
Leberstein and Cho 2014).  
 
Financial actors, though not depicted in the figure, have been active players in the hotel industry. 
Private equity firms have acquired hotels and resorts and profited from financial engineering; 
examples include Blackstone Group’s takeover of Hilton; Apollo Management and TPG’s buyout of 
Harrah’s Entertainment, now Caesar’s Entertainment; and the checkered history of Extended Stay’s 
serial takeovers by PE firms. Real estate investment trusts acquire hotel properties in sale-lease back 
deals that typically involve shareholder payouts. Strategic Hotels & Resorts owns iconic properties as 
well as hotels belonging to major chains (Ajmera 2015). 
 
 




The structure of firms has undergone a major evolution over the past 3-plus decades as vertically 
integrated companies have focused on core competencies and outsourced many tasks. The increase 
in production networks and differences in the ability of lead and contractor firms to extract jointly 
produced value – rents and profit – contributes prominently to rising inequality in earnings among 
establishments and firms. This, in turn, is a major source of differences across employers in the pay 
of workers with similar skills and characteristics. 
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